Should Russia, then, after weighing these chances launch out into an
offensive war in the West, the struggle would probably assume a quite
different character from that, for example, of a Franco-German war.
Russia, owing to her vast extent, is in the first place secure against
complete subjugation. In case of defeat her centre of gravity is not
shifted. A Russian war can hardly ever, therefore, become a struggle for
political existence, and cause that straining of every nerve which such
a struggle entails. The inhabitants will hardly ever show self-devotion
in wars whose objects cannot be clear to them. Throughout the vast
Empire the social and also political education, especially among the
peasants, is so poor, that any grasp of the problems of a foreign policy
seems quite out of the question. The sections of the people who have
acquired a little superficial learning in the defective Russian schools
have sworn to the revolutionary colours, or follow a blind
anti-progressive policy which seems to them best to meet their
interests. The former, at least, would only make use of a war to promote
their own revolutionary schemes, as they did in the crisis of the
Russo-Japanese War. Under the circumstances, there can be little idea of
a united outburst of the national spirit which would enable an offensive
war to be carried on with persistent vigour. There has been an
extraordinary change in the conditions since 1812, when the people
showed some unanimity in repelling the invasion. Should Russia to-day be
involved in a Western war with Germany and Austria, she could never
bring her whole forces into play. In the first place, the revolutionary
elements in the heart of the State would avail themselves of every
weakening of the national sources of power to effect a revolution in
internal politics, without any regard for the interests of the
community. Secondly, in the Far East, Japan or China would seize the
moment when Russia's forces in the West were fully occupied to carry out