War proved that the troops fight with great stubbornness. The struggle
showed numerous instances of heroic self-devotion, and the heaviest
losses were often borne with courage. On the other hand, the Russian
army quite failed on the offensive, in a certain sense tactically, but
essentially owing to the inadequacy of the commanders and the failure of
the individuals. The method of conducting the war was quite wrong;
indecision and irresolution characterized the Russian officers of every
grade, and no personality came forward who ever attempted to rise above
mediocrity. It can hardly be presumed that the spirit of Russian
generalship has completely changed since the defeats in Manchuria, and
that striking personalities have come on the stage. This army must
therefore always be met with a bold policy of attack.

When we contrast these conditions with the position of Germany, we
cannot blink the fact that we have to deal with immense military
difficulties, if we are to attain our own political ends or repel
successfully the attack of our opponents.

In the first place, the geographical configuration and position of our
country are very unfavourable. Our open eastern frontier offers no
opportunity for continued defence, and Berlin, the centre of the
government and administration, lies in dangerous proximity to it. Our
western frontier, in itself strong, can be easily turned on the north
through Belgium and Holland. No natural obstacle, no strong fortress, is
there to oppose a hostile invasion and neutrality is only a paper
bulwark. So in the south, the barrier of the Rhine can easily be turned
through Switzerland. There, of course, the character of the country
offers considerable difficulties, and if the Swiss defend themselves
resolutely, it might not be easy to break down their resistance. Their
army is no despicable factor of strength, and if they were attacked in