blockade. The English, if they planned such a blockade, would doubtless
count on acquiring bases on our own coast, perhaps also on the Dutch
coast. Our task therefore is to prevent such attempts by every means.
Not only must every point which is suitable for a base, such as
Heligoland, Borkum, and Sylt, be fortified in time of peace, but all
attempts at landing must be hindered and complicated by our fleet. This
task can only be fulfilled by the fleet in daytime by submarines; by
night torpedo-boats may co-operate, if the landing forces are still on
board.

Such close blockade offers various possibilities of damaging the enemy,
if the coast fortifications are so constructed with a view to the
offensive that the fleet may rally under their protection, and thus gain
an opportunity of advancing from their stations for offensive
operations. Such possibilities exist on our north coast, and our efforts
must be turned towards making the most varied use of them. We must
endeavour by renewed and unexpected attacks, especially by night, partly
with submarines and torpedo-boats, partly with battleships, to give the
blockading fleet no breathing-time, and to cause it as much loss as
possible. We must not engage in a battle with superior hostile forces,
for it is hardly possible at sea to discontinue a fight, because there
is no place whither the loser can withdraw from the effect of the
enemy's guns. An engagement, once begun must be fought out to the end.
And appreciable damage can be inflicted on the enemy only if a bold
attack on him is made. It is only possible under exceptionally
favourable circumstances--such, for example, as the proximity of the
fortified base--to abandon a fight once begun without very heavy
losses. It might certainly be practicable, by successful reconnoitring,
to attack the enemy repeatedly at times when he is weakened in one place
or another. Blockade demands naturally a certain division of forces, and