advance victoriously along the Baltic and co-operate with a combined
fleet of our opponents, any continuation of the naval war would be
rendered futile by the operations of the enemy on land.

We know also that it is of primary importance to organize our forces on
land so thoroughly that they guarantee the possibility, under all
circumstances, of our victoriously maintaining our position on the
Continent of Europe. This position must be made absolutely safe before
we can successfully carry on a war by sea, and follow an imperial policy
based on naval power. So long as Rome was threatened by Hannibal in
Italy there could be no possible idea of empire. She did not begin her
triumphal progress in history until she was thoroughly secure in her own
country.

But our discussion shows also that success on land can be influenced by
the naval war. If the enemy succeeds in destroying our fleet and landing
with strong detachments on the North Sea coast, large forces of the land
army would be required to repel them, a circumstance widely affecting
the progress of the war on the land frontiers. It is therefore vitally
necessary to prepare the defence of our own coasts so well that every
attack, even by superior numbers, may be victoriously repelled.

At the same time the consideration of the political position presses the
conviction home that in our preparations for war there must be no talk
of a gradual development of our forces by sea and land such as may lay
the lightest possible burden on the national finances, and leave ample
scope for activity in the sphere of culture. The crucial point is to put
aside all other considerations, and to prepare ourselves with the utmost
energy for a war which appears to be imminent, and will decide the whole
future of our politics and our civilization. The consideration of the