This essential contradiction between what is necessary and what is
attained appears in the enforcement of the law of universal military
service. Opinion oscillates between the wish to enforce it more or less,
and the disinclination to make the required outlay, and recourse is had
to all sorts of subterfuges which may save appearances without giving a
good trial to the system. One of these methods is the _Ersatzreserve_,
which is once more being frequently proposed. But the situation is by no
means helped by the very brief training which these units at best
receive. This system only creates a military mob, which has no capacity
for serious military operations. Such an institution would be a heavy
strain on the existing teaching _personnel_ in the army, and would be
indirectly detrimental to it as well. Nor would any strengthening of the
field army be possible under this scheme, since the cadres to contain
the mass of these special reservists are not ready to hand. This mass
would therefore only fill up the recruiting depots, and facilitate to
some degree the task of making good the losses.

A similar contradiction is often shown in the employment of the troops.
Every army at the present time is divided into regular troops, who are
already organized in time of peace and are merely brought to full
strength in war-time, and new formations, which are only organized on
mobilization. The tactical value of these latter varies much according
to their composition and the age of the units, but is always much
inferior to that of the regular troops. The Landwehr formations, which
were employed in the field in 1870-71, were an example of this,
notwithstanding the excellent services which they rendered, and the new
French formations in that campaign were totally ineffective. The sphere
of activity of such troops is the second line. In an offensive war their
duty is to secure the railroads and bases, to garrison the conquered