It is clearly an untenable proposition that political action should
depend on indefinite possibilities. A completely vague factor would be
thus arbitrarily introduced into politics, which have already many
unknown quantities to reckon with; they would thus be made more or less
dependent on chance.

It may be, then, assumed as obvious that the great practical politician
Bismarck did not wish that his words on the political application of war
should be interpreted in the sense which has nowadays so frequently been
attributed to them, in order to lend the authority of the great man to a
weak cause. Only those conditions which can be ascertained and estimated
should determine political action.

For the moral justification of the political decision we must not look
to its possible consequences, but to its aim and its motives, to the
conditions assumed by the agent, and to the trustworthiness, honour, and
sincerity of the considerations which led to action. Its practical value
is determined by an accurate grasp of the whole situation, by a correct
estimate of the resources of the two parties, by a clear anticipation of
the probable results--in short, by statesmanlike insight and promptness
of decision.

If the statesman acts in this spirit, he will have an acknowledged
right, under certain circumstances, to begin a war, regarded as
necessary, at the most favourable moment, and to secure for his country
the proud privilege of such initiative. If a war, on which a Minister
cannot willingly decide, is bound to be fought later under possibly far
more unfavourable conditions, a heavy responsibility for the greater
sacrifices that must then be made will rest on those whose strength and