security in the work of restoring their national life.

An Anglo-French protectorate would be the ideal form of moral and
material support. But Russia, as an ally, must take her place in it on
such a footing as will allay to the fullest extent her possible
apprehensions and satisfy her national sentiment. That necessity will
have to be formally recognised.

In reality Russia has ceased to care much for her Polish possessions.
Public recognition of a mistake in political morality and a voluntary
surrender of territory in the cause of European concord, cannot damage
the prestige of a powerful State. The new spheres of expansion in
regions more easily assimilable, will more than compensate Russia for the
loss of territory on the Western frontier of the Empire.

The experience of Dual Controls and similar combinations has been so
unfortunate in the past that the suggestion of a Triple Protectorate may
well appear at first sight monstrous even to unprejudiced minds. But it
must be remembered that this is a unique case and a problem altogether
exceptional, justifying the employment of exceptional means for its
solution. To those who would doubt the possibility of even bringing such
a scheme into existence the answer may be made that there are
psychological moments when any measure tending towards the ends of
concord and justice may be brought into being. And it seems that the end
of the war would be the moment for bringing into being the political
scheme advocated in this note.

Its success must depend on the singleness of purpose in the contracting
Powers, and on the wisdom, the tact, the abilities, the good-will of men
entrusted with its initiation and its further control. Finally it may be