the United States, that two thousand four hundred dollars were sent to
him in 1806, and again, in 1807, Davis, Consul for Tripoli, was directed
to insist upon the release of the wife and children. They were delivered
up by Jusuf in 1807, and taken to Syracuse in an American sloop-of-war.
Here ended the relations of the United States with Hamet Caramanli.[5]

Throughout this whole African chapter, the darling economy of the
Administration was a penny-wise policy which resulted in the usual
failure. Already in 1802, Mr. Gallatin reported that two millions and a
half, in round numbers, had been paid in tribute and presents. The
expense of fitting out the four squadrons is estimated by Mr. Sabine at
three millions and a half. The tribute extorted after 1802 and the cost
of keeping the ships in the Mediterranean amount at the lowest estimate
to two millions more. Most of this large sum might have been saved by
giving an adequate force and full powers to Commodore Dale, who had
served under Paul Jones, and knew how to manage such matters.

Unluckily for their fame, the Administration was equally parsimonious in
national spirit and pluck, and did their utmost to protect themselves
against the extravagance of such reckless fellows as Preble, Decatur,
and Eaton. In the spring of 1803, while Preble was fitting out his
squadron, Mr. Simpson, Consul at Tangier, was instructed to buy the
good-will of the Emperor of Morocco. He disobeyed his instructions, and
the Emperor withdrew his demands when he saw the American ships. About
the same time, the Secretary of State wrote to Consul Cathcart in
relation to Tripoli:--

"It is thought best that you should not be tied down to a refusal of
presents, whether to be included in the peace, or to be made from time
to time during its continuance,--especially as in the latter case the