never able to see that the Russian government did anything at that
stage to stimulate the insurrection, though Boutakoff expressed in the
most unreserved manner his sympathies. Later I became convinced that
Dendrinos did secretly, and more from antagonism to Derché than
from any orders from his government, advise against concession, as
Parthenios used to come secretly by night to him for consultation. But
I am persuaded that at that time the Russian government had not
urged the movement, though a secret visit from Jonine on the Russian
dispatch boat at an early stage of affairs was evidence that the
position was being studied by Russia. With Boutakoff I was for several
years in the closest sympathy, and we subsequently acted together, but
never did I discover any indication of his taking an active part, or
being aware that Dendrinos had taken one, in the early movement. In
fact, the anxiety of the latter that I should keep secret, even from
Boutakoff, his action in the matter, indicated the contrary. What
Russia had done at Athens I had no opportunity to learn, but in Crete
I am convinced that she then did little or nothing.

Having scoured the plains and lower hilly district west of Canea,
Mustapha now organized an expedition against Sphakia, defended by the
Hellenic volunteers and the bands of the Apokorona and Sphakia at
Vafé. He obtained a decisive victory with heavy loss of the Egyptian
contingent, but his courage failed him before Askyphó, the great
natural fortress of Sphakia, and he waited a month at Prosnero in the
Apokorona, negotiating to gain time, but offering no concessions. At
this juncture arrived the only man who made any military mark in the
war, Colonel Coroneos, a Greek veteran, and competent commander of
such a force as Crete could furnish. As Zimbrakaki, who commanded the
Greek volunteers, had assumed the command of the western section,
while the chiefs of the eastern section, around and beyond Ida, had