the will of the Porte, and must accept as concession what they had won
a right to from an effective resistance, as yet not even partially
subdued. He was not himself deceived, but the Sultan had passed into
a condition of insane fury, and could not be induced to listen to any
concessions or entertain any proposition but complete surrender. He
had, Mr. Morris wrote me, had a model of the island made, which he
used to bombard with little cannon, to give vent to his rage. All
the powers, with the exception of England, now advised the Porte to
concede a principality. The English policy in this case has always
seemed to me mistaken, and in questionable faith, for by the protocol
of February 20, 1830, the signatory powers bound themselves to secure
for Crete a principality like that of Samos. For this defection of
England from the general accord of the powers, Greece was, probably,
mainly responsible, for at that juncture the influence of Greek
demagogues prevailed in the island to make a compromise difficult, and
the principality would certainly have been refused; still, England was
pledged to the offer of it. I find in the record I made at the time
the following passage:--

"The tactics of Greece were of a nature to make the chances of Crete
more precarious than they need have been. The policy of Crete for
Greece, rather than Crete for her own good, made confusion and
jealousy in the conduct of the war much greater than they need have
been. What the Cretans wanted was a good leader, arms, and bread.
Greece sent them rival chiefs without subordination, a rabble of
volunteers, who quarreled with the islanders, and weakened the
cause by deserting it as soon as they felt the strain of danger and
hardship; and if, after the first campaign, they were more wise in
enrolling men to go to Crete, they still allowed the jealousies and
hostilities of the leaders to go unchecked by any of those measures