longer any danger from the Turkish army; but it was, I suppose, in
pursuance of some political scheme which had brought France and Russia
together. The Turkish army was nowhere in force or spirit to penetrate
into the interior, and the demoralization was such that soldiers
deserted from battalions ordered for Crete. The military hospitals in
Crete were full, and the troops so mutinous that operations had become
impracticable beyond holding and keeping up communication with the
blockhouses and posts within easy reach.

Omar Pasha having failed to make any impression, A'ali Pasha, the
grand vizier, came out in October, 1867, to try conciliation. He
offered all that the Cretans could desire, short of annexation to
Greece,--an assembly of their own, freedom from taxation for a term of
years, a prince of their own election without reserve, and the half of
the customs receipts. I waited on him, as I had on the former envoys
of the Sultan, as a matter of etiquette, and was surprised by the just
and reasonable tone and substance of his propositions. They seemed
even better for the Cretans than annexation to Greece, and I so
represented them to Mr. Morris. But I received from him the orders of
General Ignatieff to urge the Cretans to reject them, as the certain
alternative was their independence and annexation to Greece. I obeyed
my orders without concealing my own sentiments in favor of the
acceptance of the offers of the grand vizier.

A'ali made on me an impression of honesty and justice such as I
had never seen in any Turkish official. He dissembled none of his
difficulties, and discussed the questions arising out of the position
without reserve. For the first time since the affair began I felt
my sympathies drawn to the Turkish aspect of the political question
involved. I had long seen that Crete could not be governed from Athens