hear it over again, that I might consider the _sense_." Burke also dealt
in paradoxes occasionally; in short, he will seldom satisfy a careful
reader, and his most ardent admirers have been known to confess
themselves rather pleased than edified by his works. By way of specimen,
as to the remarks we have ventured to make, we shall endeavour to take
to pieces the following sophism, for a sophism we cannot help
considering it:--

"Duties are not voluntary; duty and will are even contradictory
terms."--"Men have an extreme disrelish to be told of their duty; this
is, of course, because every duty is a limitation of power."

These two sentences are taken from different parts of the writings of
Burke, but they are the same in tendency, though not in expression; they
imply simply, that duty is a restraint, and that our duties and our
inclinations call us different roads. Let us first consider what the
term "duty" signifies. From Johnson we get this explanation of it: "What
we are bound to do by the impulse of nature, the dictates of law, or the
voice of reason." Now, to take these three cases as they stand, nature
has surely ordained everything for our advantage, and therefore in
obeying her, we have rather an accession than a diminution of power;
with respect to ourselves, the calls of nature are even agreeable to us;
and as far as our duties concern others, men seem in general to perform
their natural duties willingly, such as a duty to a child, a parent, &c.
Then with regard to the duties imposed on us by law, many of these
appear indeed at first to be great and unnecessary restraints, but if we
examine the matter, we shall find that very few laws have been framed
that have not rather good than evil for their object. Society doubtless
imposes many restrictions on its members, but it also confers far
greater comparative advantages in lieu of them, so that if we were