lacked in ability, I have endeavored to supply by diligence; and what I
could conveniently strengthen by better authority than my own, I have not
failed to support with all that was due, of names, guillemets, and
references.

Like every other grammarian, I stake my reputation as an author, upon "a
certain set of opinions," and a certain manner of exhibiting them,
appealing to the good sense of my readers for the correctness of both. All
contrary doctrines are unavoidably censured by him who attempts to sustain
his own; but, to grammatical censures, no more importance ought to be
attached than what belongs to grammar itself. He who cares not to be
accurate in the use of language, is inconsistent with himself, if he be
offended at verbal criticism; and he who is displeased at finding his
opinions rejected, is equally so, if he cannot prove them to be well
founded. It is only in cases susceptible of a rule, that any writer can be
judged deficient. I can censure no man for differing from me, till I can
show him a principle which he ought to follow. According to Lord Kames, the
standard of taste, both in arts and in manners, is "the common sense of
mankind," a principle founded in the universal conviction of a common
nature in our species. (See _Elements of Criticism_, Chap, xxv, Vol. ii, p.
364.) If this is so, the doctrine applies to grammar as fully as to any
thing about which criticism may concern itself.

But, to the discerning student or teacher, I owe an apology for the
abundant condescension with which I have noticed in this volume the works
of unskillful grammarians. For men of sense have no natural inclination to
dwell upon palpable offences against taste and scholarship; nor can they be
easily persuaded to approve the course of an author who makes it his
business to criticise petty productions. And is it not a fact, that
grammatical authorship has sunk so low, that no man who is capable of