keep well-informed, and undoubtedly large profits were made; but the
circumstances were such that it seems most probable that profits were less
than market opportunities would have allowed had not the issue been so
long in doubt. Nevertheless there was much speculative activity, and the
charge was soon made that it extended into Congress.[Footnote: This charge
was put forth by John Taylor in pamphlets printed in 1793 and 1794, in
which he reviewed the financial policy of the Administration and gave a
list of Congressmen who had invested in the public funds. The facts on
which this charge rests have been collected and examined by Professor
Beard in his _Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy_. His analysis
shows that out of sixty-four members of the House, twenty-nine were
security holders, and of these twenty-one voted for and eight voted
against assumption. But the facts disclosed do not sustain his theory that
the issue was essentially a conflict between capitalism and agrarianism.
The assumption bill was lifted to its place on the statute book through
the leverage exerted by Hamilton and Jefferson, with Washington's prestige
as their fulcrum. The characters of these three men resist schemes of
classification according to economic interest. The principal value of
analysis of the economic elements of the struggle is to protect from
undervaluation the motives that actuated the opposition to Hamilton's
measures. The historian has the advantage of a perspective denied to
participants in events, and this fact is apt to turn unduly to the
discredit of lost causes.]

The passage of assumption was the turning point. Other important measures
followed, but none of them met with difficulties which the Administration
could not overcome by ordinary methods of persuasion and appeal. A
national bank was authorized by an act approved on February 25, 1791.
Hamilton's famous report on manufactures, a masterly analysis of the
sources of national wealth and of the means of improving them, was sent to