bills drawn by him to cover his expenditures.

Jefferson, who while Minister to France had been closely connected with
these proceedings, was called upon by Congress for a report upon them, not
long after he took office as Secretary of State. This report, December 28,
1790, set forth the fact that the Mediterranean trade, which had employed
from eighty to one hundred ships with about twelve hundred seamen, had
been almost destroyed. In the interest of the negotiations, it had been
necessary "to suffer the captives and their friends to believe for a
while, that no attention was paid to them, no notice taken of their
letters," and they were "still under this impression." Jefferson contented
himself with submitting the facts in the case, remarking that "upon the
whole it rests with Congress to decide between war, tribute, and ransom.
If war, they will consider how far our own resources shall be called
forth, and how far they will enable the Executive to engage, in the forms
of the Constitution, the cooperation of other Powers. If tribute or
ransom, it will rest with them to limit and provide the amount; and
with the Executive, observing the same constitutional forms, to make
arrangements for employing it to the best advantage."

The problem which Jefferson thus put before Congress was a singularly
difficult one. Among the captives was Captain Richard O'Brien, whose ship,
the _Dauphin_ of Philadelphia, was taken July 30, 1785. He had a ready pen
and, apparently, had unrestricted access to the mails. His letters were
those of a shrewd observer and depicted a situation that bristled with
perplexity. The Algerines had about a dozen vessels, their armament
ranging from ten to thirty-six guns, but of these vessels only two
belonged to the Government, the others being private ventures. Though they
preyed on merchantmen, they avoided engagements, and did not come out at
all if there were vessels cruising for them. A blockade was effective only