was used effectively by a number of speakers. It turned the main
position taken by the advocates of non-intercourse, which was that the
real objection came from the bondholders who feared that the ensuing
loss of revenue might prevent them from getting their interest. Such
imputations of sordid motive became fruitless when the issue was raised of
the constitutional authority of the President, but the advocates of
non-intercourse met this new point of view by pointing out that the
Constitution gave Congress the right to regulate commerce. The feeling
against Great Britain was so great that the House was bent on indulging
it, and on April 25, 1794, the non-intercourse bill was passed by a vote
of 58 to 34. The Senate was so evenly divided that, on the motion to pass
the bill to its third reading, there was a tie vote, and Vice-President
Adams, who was called upon for a casting vote, gave it against the bill.
About a month later in the House another attempt was made to carry the
policy of non-intercourse by a joint resolution, but by this time a
reaction in favor of the Administration had set in and the resolution
received only 24 yeas to 46 nays, James Madison being among those who
stuck to the proposal to the last.

While the House was abandoning itself to reckless mischief-making,
Washington was striving to arrange matters by negotiation. The
perplexities of his situation were great and varied. As a military man
he knew that American jurisdiction was precarious so long as Great
Britain held the interior. The matter had been the subject of prolix
correspondence between Jefferson and Hammond, but the American demands
that Great Britain should surrender the frontier posts in accordance with
the treaty of peace had been met by demands that America, in accordance
with that same treaty, should first satisfy various claims of British
subjects for restitution, indemnity, and relief. The regular diplomatic
machinery stuck fast at this point, both at home and abroad. In one of his