that anything is, which, by the agreement of mankind, is called good
or excellent, viz., that which is most to general advantage, and
between which and a reward there is a suitableness, and the like. And
the other is, that which consists in the sense of the heart: as when
there is a sense of the beauty, amiableness, or sweetness of a thing;
so that the heart is sensible of pleasure and delight in the presence
of the idea of it. In the former is exercised merely the speculative
faculty, or the understanding, strictly so called, or as spoken of in
distinction from the will or disposition of the soul. In the latter,
the will, or inclination, or heart is mainly concerned.

Thus there is a difference between having an opinion that God is holy
and gracious, and having a sense of the loveliness and beauty of that
holiness and grace. There is a difference between having a rational
judgment that honey is sweet, and having a sense of its sweetness. A
man may have the former that knows not how honey tastes; but a man can
not have the latter unless he has an idea of the taste of honey in
his mind. So there is a difference between believing that a person is
beautiful and having a sense of his beauty. The former may be obtained
by hearsay, but the latter only by seeing the countenance. There is a
wide difference between mere speculative rational judging anything
to be excellent, and having a sense of its sweetness and beauty. The
former rests only in the head, speculation only is concerned in it;
but the heart is concerned in the latter. When the heart is sensible
of the beauty and amiableness of a thing, it necessarily feels
pleasure in the apprehension. It is implied in a person's being
heartily sensible of the loveliness of a thing, that the idea of it is
sweet and pleasant to his soul; which is a far different thing from
having a rational opinion that it is excellent.