But let him make up his mind to employ it in guerilla war, and he will
find the force quite competent for that, I warrant. His business, so
at least it seems to me, will be to keep his men perpetually in
readiness to strike a blow, and without exposing himself, to play
sentinel, waiting for any false move on the part of the hostile
armament. And it is a way with soldiers, bear in mind, the more
numerous they are, the more blunders they commit. They must needs
scatter of set purpose[9] in search of provisions; or through the
disorder incidental to a march, some will advance and others lag
behind, beyond a proper limit. Blunders like these, then, our hipparch
must not let pass unpunished (unless he wishes the whole of Attica to
become a gigantic camp);[10] keeping his single point steadily in
view, that when he strikes a blow he must be expeditious and retire
before the main body has time to rally to the rescue.

[9] {epimeleia}. Cf. "Cyrop." V. iii. 47.

[10] Lit. "or else the whole of Attica will be one encampment." As at
the date of the fortification of Decelea (413 B.C.), which
permanently commanded the whole country. See Thuc. vii. 27. Al.
Courier, "autrement vous n'avez plus de camp, ou pour mieux dire,
tout le pays devient votre camp."

Again, it frequently happens on the march, that an army will get into
roads where numbers are no advantage. Again, in the passage of rivers,
defiles, and the like, it is possible for a general with a head on his
shoulders to hang on the heels of an enemy in security, and to
determine with precision[11] the exact number of the enemy he will
care to deal with. Occasionally the fine chance occurs to atack the
foe while encamping or breakfasting or supping, or as the men turn out