the nominal chief. The letter was a curious example of the weakness and
of the bumptiousness of the man, while it gave evidence also, it is fair
to say, of a real public-spirited desire that things should go right and
that the nation should be saved. It was evident that he had as yet no
adequate faith in the capacity of the President.

Lincoln's answer was characteristic of the man. There was no irritation
with the bumptiousness, no annoyance at the lack of confidence on the
part of his associate. He states simply: "There must, of course, be
control and the responsibility for this control must rest with me." He
points out further that the general policy of the administration had
been outlined in the inaugural, that no action since taken had been
inconsistent with this. The necessary preparations for the defence of
the government were in train and, as the President trusted, were being
energetically pushed forward by the several department heads. "I have a
right," said Lincoln, "to expect loyal co-operation from my associates
in the Cabinet. I need their counsel and the nation needs the best
service that can be secured from our united wisdom." The letter of
Seward was put away and appears never to have been referred to between
the two men. It saw the light only after the President's death. If he
had lived it might possibly have been suppressed altogether. A month
later, Seward said to a friend, "There is in the Cabinet but one vote
and that is cast by the President."

The post next in importance under the existing war conditions was that
of Secretary of War. The first man to hold this post was Simon Cameron
of Pennsylvania. Cameron was very far from being a friend of Lincoln's.
The two men had had no personal relations and what Lincoln knew of him
he liked not at all. The appointment had been made under the pressure of
the Republicans of Pennsylvania, a State whose support was, of course,