government of the United States an opportunity for adjustment without
loss of dignity. Albert was clear in his mind that Great Britain ought
not to be committed to war for the destruction of the great Republic of
the West and for the establishment of a state of which the corner-stone
was slavery. Fortunately, Victoria was quite prepared to accept in this
matter Albert's judgment. Palmerston protested and threatened
resignation, but finally submitted.

When the news of the capture of the commissioners came to Washington,
Seward for once was in favour of a conservative rather than a truculent
course of action. He advised that the commissioners should be
surrendered at once rather than to leave to Great Britain the
opportunity for making a dictatorial demand. Lincoln admitted the risk
of such demand and the disadvantage of making the surrender under
pressure, but he took the ground that if the United States waited for
the British contention, a certain diplomatic advantage could be gained.
When the demand came, Lincoln was able, with a rewording (not for the
first time) of Seward's despatch, to take the ground that the government
of the United States was "well pleased that Her Majesty's government
should have finally accepted the old-time American contention that
vessels of peace should not be searched on the high seas by vessels of
war." It may be recalled that the exercise of the right of search had
been one of the most important of the grievances which had brought about
the War of 1812-1814. In the discussion of the Treaty of Ghent in 1814,
the English and American commissioners, while agreeing that this right
of search must be given up, had not been able to arrive at a form of
words, satisfactory to both parties, for its revocation. Both sets of
commissioners were very eager to bring their proceedings to a close. The
Americans could of course not realise that if they had waited a few
weeks the news of the battle of New Orleans, fought in January, 1815,