The weather was fair, the sea moderate, and the conditions generally
favorable to the torpedo; but the Whitehead missed its mark, although the
Richelieu's speed was only three knots. Running at full speed, the torpedo
boat, even in this moderate sea, deemed it prudent to keep the launching
tube closed, and selected a range of 250 yards for opening it and firing.
Just at the moment of discharge a little sea came on board, the boat yawed,
the torpedo aim was changed more than 30 deg., and it passed astern without
touching its object.

While the Milford Haven operations have taught some valuable lessons, they
were conducted under but few of the conditions that are most likely to
occur in actual warfare; and had the defense been carried on with an
organization and command equal to that of the attack, the Navy's triumph
would, perhaps, not have been so easily secured, and the results might have
been very different.

May not the apparent deficiencies of the defense have been due to the fact
that soldiers instead of sailors are given the control of the harbor and
coast defense? Is this right? Ought they not to be organized on a naval
basis? This is no new suggestion, but its importance needs emphasis.

These operations, however, convinced at least one deeply interested
spectator, Lord Brassey, to the extent of calling attention "to the urgent
necessity for the construction of a class of torpedo vessels capable of
keeping the sea in company with an armored fleet."

There is no one in Great Britain who takes a greater interest in the
progress of the British Navy than Lord Brassey, and we take pleasure in
quoting from his letter of August 23 last to the _Times_, in which he
expressed the following opinion: "The torpedo boats ordered last year from