All investigations of the sea-going qualities of torpedo boats show that
while the basin experiments are highly satisfactory, those made at sea
prove with equal force the unreliability of these craft when they leave the
coast. At the beginning of the Milford Haven operations, the boisterous
weather necessitated the postponing of operations, on account of the
unfitness of the torpedo boat crews to continue work after the twelve hours
of serious fatigue they had already undergone. In the French evolutions,
the difficulties of the passage from Bastia to Ajaccio, although not
remarkably severe, so unfitted fifteen of the twenty boats that they could
take no part in the final attack. In two nights we find recorded collisions
which disable boats Nos. 52, 61, 63, and 72, and required their return to
port for repairs.

Of the twenty-two torpedo boats leaving Toulon a few days before, but six
arrived near the enemy, although their commanders displayed admirable
energy. One had run aground, and was full of water; another had been sunk
by collision; another's engine was seriously injured; and as for the rest,
they could not follow.

Of the boats under the command of Admiral Brown de Colstoun, but five
remained for service, for the sixth received an accident to her machinery
which prevented her taking part in the attack.

During the operations off the Balearic Isles, only one of six boats
attacked, and none was able to follow the armorclads, all meeting with
circumstances quite unexpected and embarrassing.

With the weather as it existed May 13, the armorclads had the torpedo fleet