can a general foresee whether it will profit him to conduct a
campaign, nor a politician be certain whether his leadership will turn
to evil or good. Nor can the man who weds a fair wife, looking forward
to joy, know whether through her he shall not reap sorrow. Neither can
he who has built up a powerful connection in the state know whether he
shall not by means of it be cast out of his city. To suppose that all
these matters lay within the scope of human judgment, to the exclusion
of the preternatural, was preternatural folly. Nor was it less
extravagant to go and consult the will of Heaven on any questions
which it is given to us to decide by dint of learning. As though a man
should inquire, "Am I to choose an expert driver as my coachman, or
one who has never handled the reins?" "Shall I appoint a mariner to be
skipper of my vessel, or a landsman?" And so with respect to all we
may know by numbering, weighing, and measuring. To seek advice from
Heaven on such points was a sort of profanity. "Our duty is plain," he
would observe; "where we are permitted to work through our natural
faculties, there let us by all means apply them. But in things which
are hidden, let us seek to gain knowledge from above, by divination;
for the gods," he added, "grant signs to those to whom they will be
gracious."

[6] Or, "in the sphere of the determined," {ta anagkaia} = certa,
quorum eventus est necessarius; "things positive, the law-ordained
department of life," as we might say. See Grote, "H. G." i. ch.
xvi. 500 and passim.

[7] Reading {os nomizoien}, or if {os enomizen}, translate "As to
things with certain results, he advised them to do them in the way
in which he believed they would be done best"; i.e. he did not
say, "follow your conscience," but, "this course seems best to me