Thus, to use a familiar instance, we might think it unjust that a
landowner should be permitted by the State to have the sole right of
fishing in a certain river, and though one's conscience would not in
the least rebuke one for fishing in that river, one might abstain from
doing so because of the inconvenience which might ensue. Or, again, if
society considers a certain practice to be morally meritorious, one
might acquiesce in performing it even though one disbelieved in its
advisability; thus a man might believe that a marriage ceremony was a
meaningless thing, and that mutual love was a far higher consecration
than the consecration of a priest; and yet he might rightly acquiesce
in having his own wedding celebrated according to the rites of a
particular church, for the sake of compliance with social traditions,
and because no principle was involved in his standing out against it,
or even because he thought it a seemly and beautiful thing. The only
compliance which is immoral is the compliance with a practice which one
believes to be immoral and which yet is sanctioned by society. Thus if
a man believes hunting to be immoral, he must not take part in it for
the sake of such enjoyment as he may find in it, or for the sake of
friendly intercourse, simply because no penalty awaits him for doing
what he knows to be wrong.

The only criterion in the matter is this: one must ask oneself what are
the things that one is ashamed of doing, the things for which, when
done, one's own conscience smites one in secret, even if they are
accompanied by no social penalty whatever, even if they are forgiven
and forgotten. These are not the things which one would simply dislike
others to know that one has done. One might fear the condemnation of
others, even though one did not believe that a particular act was in
itself wrong; because of the misunderstandings and vexation and grief
and derision that the knowledge of one's action might create. To take