that his stock of provisions would be exhausted before he got half-way.
In such a case the party might starve to death or perish from exposure.
Besides he did not know what he should do for carriages; and he dreaded
the rigor of the winter weather. [Footnote: Haldimand MSS.; in his
various letters Hamilton sets forth the difficulties at length.] There
were undoubtedly appalling difficulties in the way of a mid-winter march
and attack; and the fact that Clark attempted and performed the feat
which Hamilton dared not try, marks just the difference between a man of
genius and a good, brave, ordinary commander.

He Plans a Great Campaign in the Spring.

Having decided to suspend active operations during the cold weather, he
allowed the Indians to scatter back to their villages for the winter,
and sent most of the Detroit militia home, retaining in garrison only
thirty-four British regulars, forty French volunteers, and a dozen white
leaders of the Indians [Footnote: _Do._ B. Vol. 122, p. 287. Return of
Vincennes garrison for Jan. 30, 1779.]; in all eighty or ninety whites,
and a probably larger number of red auxiliaries. The latter were
continually kept out on scouting expeditions; Miamis and Shawnees were
sent down to watch the Ohio, and take scalps in the settlements, while
bands of Kickapoos, the most warlike of the Wabash Indians, and of
Ottawas, often accompanied by French partisans, went towards the
Illinois country. [Footnote: Hamilton's "brief account," and his letter
of December 18th.] Hamilton intended to undertake a formidable campaign
in the spring. He had sent messages to Stuart, the British Indian agent
in the south, directing him to give war-belts to the Chickasaws,
Cherokees, and Creeks, that a combined attack on the frontier might take
place as soon as the weather opened. He himself was to be joined by
reinforcements from Detroit, while the Indians were to gather round him