election, I will be either at Constantinople or dead."

The Turks, who had been since 1453 settled at Constantinople, were the
terror of Christian Europe; and Germany especially had need of a puissant
and valiant defender against them. Francis I. calculated that the
Christians of Germany and Hungary would see in him, the King of France
and the victor of Melegnano, their most imposing and most effectual
champion.

Having a superficial mind and being full of vain confidence, Francis I.
was mistaken about the forces and chances on his side, as well as about
the real and natural interests of France, and also his own. There was no
call for him to compromise himself in this electoral struggle of kings,
and in a distant war against triumphant Islamry. He miscalculated the
strong position and personal valor of the rival with whom he would have
to measure swords. Charles of Austria was but nineteen, and Francis I.
was twenty-three, when they entered, as antagonists, into the arena of
European politics. Charles had as yet gained no battle and won no
renown; while Francis I. was already a victorious king and a famous
knight. But the young archduke's able governor, William de Croy, Lord of
Chievres, "had early trained him," says M. Mignet, "to the understanding
and management of his various interests; from the time that he was
fifteen, Charles presided every day at his council; there he himself read
out the contents of despatches which were delivered to him the moment
they arrived, were it even in the dead of night; his council had become
his school, and business served him for books. . . . Being naturally
endowed with superior parts, a penetrating intellect and rare firmness of
character, he schooled himself to look Fortune in the face without being
intoxicated by her smiles or troubled at her frowns, to be astonished by
nothing that happened, and to make up his mind in any danger. He had