of so shameful a desertion of men who have sacrificed
all to their duty and to their reliance upon our faith.'
It seems probable that the British commissioners could
have obtained, on paper at any rate, better terms for
the Loyalists. It is very doubtful if the Americans would
have gone to war again over such a question. In 1783 the
position of Great Britain was relatively not weaker, but
stronger, than in 1781, when hostilities had ceased. The
attitude of the French minister, and the state of the
French finances, made it unlikely that France would lend
her support to further hostilities. And there is no doubt
that the American states were even more sorely in need
of peace than was Great Britain.

When the terms of peace were announced, great was the
bitterness among the Loyalists. One of them protested in
_Rivington's Gazette_ that 'even robbers, murderers, and
rebels are faithful to their fellows and never betray
each other,' and another sang,

'Tis an honour to serve the bravest of nations,
And be left to be hanged in their capitulations.

If the terms of the peace had been observed, the plight
of the Loyalists would have been bad enough. But as it
was, the outcome proved even worse. Every clause in the
treaty relating to the Loyalists was broken over and over
again. There was no sign of an abatement of the popular
feeling against them; indeed, in some places, the spirit
of persecution seemed to blaze out anew. One of Washington's