abstract, are doubtless infinite; that is, the term will designate,
alike and equally, any degree of whiteness or hardness which you may
think of, and any unknown degree even whiter and harder than what you
think of. But when perceived as invested in a given mass of snow or
granite before us, they are divested of that indeterminateness, and
become restricted to a determinate measure and degree.

Having thus indicated the points on which we are compelled to dissent
from Mr Mill's refutation of Sir W. Hamilton in the pleading against M.
Cousin, we shall pass to the seventh chapter, in which occurs his first
controversy with Mr Mansel. This passage has excited more interest, and
will probably be remembered by a larger number of readers, than any
portion of the book. We shall give it in his own words (pp. 99--103),
since the energetic phraseology is quite as remarkable as the thought:--

'There is but one way for Mr Mansel out of this difficulty,
and he adopts it. He must maintain, not merely that an
Absolute Being is unknowable in himself, but that the
Relative attributes of an Absolute Being are unknowable
also.[5] He must say that we do not know what Wisdom,
Justice, Benevolence, Mercy, &c., are, as they exist in God.
Accordingly, he does say so. "It is a fact" (says Mr Mansel)
"which experience forces upon us, and which it is useless,
were it possible, to disguise, that the representation of
God after the model of the highest human morality which we
are capable of conceiving, is not sufficient to account for
all the phenomena exhibited by the course of his natural
Providence. The infliction of physical suffering, the
permission of moral evil, the adversity of the good, the
prosperity of the wicked, the crimes of the guilty involving