conveying a most inadequate idea of its real magnitude) with the
goodness of God. Mr Mill repudiates the explanatory hypothesis tendered
by Mr Mansel, as a solution, but without suggesting any better
hypothesis of his own. For ourselves, we are far from endorsing Mr
Mansel's solution as satisfactory; yet we can hardly be surprised if he
considers it less unsatisfactory than no solution at all. And when we
reflect how frequently and familiarly predicates applicable to man are
applied to the Supreme Being, when they cannot possibly be understood
about Him in the same sense--we see no ground for treating the
proceeding as disingenuous, which Mr Mill is disposed to do. Indeed, it
cannot easily be avoided: and Mr Mill himself furnishes us with some
examples in the present volume. At page 491, he says:--

'It would be difficult to find a stronger argument in favour
of Theism, than that the eye must have been made by one who
sees, and the ear by one who hears.'

In the words here employed, _seeing_ and _hearing_ are predicted of God.

Now when we predicate of men, that they _see_ or _hear_, we affirm facts
of extreme complexity, especially in the case of _seeing_; facts partly
physical, partly mental, involving multifarious movements and agencies
of nerves, muscles, and other parts of the organism, together with
direct sensational impressions, and mental reconstruction of the past,
inseparably associated therewith; all which, so far as they are known,
are perspicuously enumerated in the work of Professor Bain[11] on the
'Senses and the Intellect,' Again, Mr Mill speaks (in p. 102 and
elsewhere) of 'the veracity of God.' When we say of our neighbour that
he is a veracious man, we ascribe to him a habit of speaking the truth;
that is, of employing his physical apparatus of speech, and his mental