will really go. They are satisfied with introspection of their own
present minds; without collecting results of the like process as applied
to other minds, in different times and places. They declare various
beliefs to be necessary to the human mind universally, merely because
such is the actual fact with their own minds and with those immediately
around them; sometimes even in defiance of proof that there are (or have
been) persons not sharing such beliefs, and occasionally even believing
the contrary; therefore, when even the introspective method really
disallows their affirmative instead of sustaining it. This is, in
truth, an abuse of the introspective method; yet even if that method
were employed in its fullest extent--if the same incapability of
believing otherwise could be shown as common to all mankind--it might
still be only the effect of a strong association. The analytical method
must still be called in to ascertain whether we are forced to suppose
such incapability to be an original fact of consciousness, or whether it
may not have been generated in the mind by circumstances under the
natural working of the laws of association. It is certain that these
laws not only may, but must, give birth to artificial inconceivabilities
in the mind--and that some of these may be equal in strength to such, if
any, as are natural.

'The History of Science' (says Mr Mill, following out the
same train of reasoning which we read in the third Book of
his 'System of Logic') 'teems with inconceivabilities which
have been conquered; and with supposed necessary truths,
which have first ceased to be thought necessary, then to be
thought true, and have finally come to be deemed
impossible.'--p. 150.

After various observations, chiefly exhibiting the rashness of many