point of view (not always the same) belonging to the author, partly from
that of numerous predecessors whom he cites. We recognize also in Sir W.
Hamilton an amount of intellectual independence which seldom accompanies
such vast erudition. He recites many different opinions, but he judges
them all for himself; and, what is of still greater moment, he
constantly gives the reasons for his judgments. To us these reasons are
always of more or less value, whether we admit them to be valid or not.
Many philosophers present their own doctrine as if it were so much
ascertained and acknowledged truth, either intimating, or leading you to
suppose, that though erroneous beliefs to the contrary formerly
prevailed, these have now become discredited with every one. We do not
censure this way of proceeding, but we prefer the manner of Sir W.
Hamilton. He always keeps before us divergence and discrepancy of view
as the normal condition of reasoned truth or philosophy; the
characteristic postulate of which is, that every affirmative and every
negative shall have its appropriate reasons clearly and fully
enunciated.

In this point of view the appendix annexed to the lectures is also
valuable; and the four copious appendixes or dissertations following
the edition of Reid's works, are more valuable still. How far Sir W.
Hamilton has there furnished good proof of his own doctrines on External
Perception, and on the Primary Qualities of Matter, we shall not now
determine; but to those who dissent from him, as well as to those who
agree with him, his reasonings on these subjects are highly instructive:
while the full citations from so many other writers contribute
materially not only to elucidate the points directly approached, but
also to enlarge our knowledge of philosophy generally. We set particular
value upon this preservation of the traditions of philosophy, and upon
this maintenance of a known perpetual succession among the speculative