respective conclusions by reasons which they deem sufficient. Sir W.
Hamilton declares that both the one doctrine and the other are
inconceivable and incomprehensible; yet that, by the law of Excluded
Middle, one or other of them must be true: and he decides in favour of
Free-will, of which he believes himself to be distinctly conscious;
moreover, Free-will is essential (he thinks) to moral responsibility, of
which also he feels himself conscious. He confesses himself, however,
unable to explain the possibility of Free-will; but he maintains that
the same may be said about Necessity also. 'The champions of both the
two opposite doctrines are at once resistless in attack, and impotent in
defence'--(Hamilton's 'Footnotes on Reid,' p. 602.) Mr Mansel also
asserts, even more confidently than Sir W. Hamilton, that we are
directly conscious of Free-will--(p. 503).

Sir W. Hamilton has himself given some of the best arguments against the
doctrine of Free-will, in refutation of Reid: arguments, some of which
are here cited by Mr Mill with praise which they well deserve--(pp. 497,
498). But Mr Mill's own reasoning on the same side is of a still higher
order, enlarging the grounds previously urged in the last book of his
'System of Logic,' He protests against the term _Necessity_; and
discards the idea of Necessity, if it be understood to imply anything
more than invariability of antecedence and consequence. If it mean
_that_, experience proves thus much about antecedents in the world of
mind, as in the world of matter: if it mean more, experience does not
prove more, either in the world of matter or in the world of mind: nor
have we any grounds for affirming it in either--(p. 501.) If it were
true, therefore, that consciousness attested Free-will, we should find
the testimony of consciousness opposed to a full proof from experience
and induction. But does consciousness really attest what is called
Free-will? Mr Mill analyzes the case, and declares in the negative.