after his affectionate remonstrance to Hippolytus had been disregarded,
supplicating Aphroditê to pardon the recalcitrancy of that virtuous but
obstinate youth, is characteristic and touching (114-120.)]

[Footnote 11: See especially his chapter ii. on the Sensations of Sight,
pp. 222, 241--247, in the second edition of this work.]

[Footnote 12: Descartes says, in his 'Principia Philosophiæ,' i 51--'Et
quidem substantia quæ nullâ planè re indigeat, unica tantum potest
intelligi--nempe Deus. Alias vero omnes, non nisi ope concursûs Dei
existere posse perspicimus. Atque ideo nomen substantiæ non convenit Deo
et illis _univocè_, ut dici solet in scholis, hoc est, nulla ejus
nominis significatio potest distinctè intelligi, quæ Deo et creaturis
sit communis.']

[Footnote 13: At the same time, we cannot go along with Mr Mill in the
following affirmation (p. 201):--

'This natural probability is converted into certainty when we take into
consideration that universal law of our experience which is termed the
Law of Causation, and which makes us _unable to conceive the beginning
of anything without_ an antecedent condition, _or cause.'_ Such
'inability to conceive' appears to us not in correspondence with facts.
First, it cannot be properly either affirmed or denied, until agreement
is obtained what the word _cause_ means. If three persons, A, B, and C,
agree in affirming it--A adopting the meaning of Aristotle, B that of
Sir William Hamilton, and C that of Mr Mill--the agreement is purely
verbal; or rather, all three concur in having a mental exigency pressing
for satisfaction, but differ as to the hypothesis which satisfies it.