carriage, it would not follow that the still greater degree of
cheapness, produced by the additional saving of the cost of carriage
itself, would also affect the demand of both countries in precisely an
equal degree. But we cannot be said to bear an expense, which, if saved,
would be saved to somebody else, and not to us. Two countries may have
equal shares of the clear benefit of the trade, while, if the cost of
carriage were saved, they would divide that saving unequally. If so,
they divide the gross gain in one unequal ratio, the cost in another
unequal ratio, though their shares of the cost being deducted from their
shares of the gain leave equal remainders.

4. The question naturally suggests itself, whether any country, by its
own legislative policy, can engross to itself a larger share of the
benefits of foreign commerce, than would fall to it in the natural or
spontaneous course of trade.

The answer is, it can. By taxing exports, for instance, we may, under
certain circumstances, produce a division of the advantage of the trade
more favourable to ourselves. In some cases, we may draw into our
coffers, at the expense of foreigners, not only the whole tax, but more
than the tax: in other cases, we should gain exactly the tax,--in
others, less than the tax. In this last case, a part of the tax is borne
by ourselves: possibly the whole, possibly even, as we shall show, more
than the whole.

Suppose that England taxes her export of cloth: the tax not being
supposed high enough to induce Germany to produce cloth for herself. The
price at which cloth can be sold in Germany is augmented by the tax.
This will probably diminish the quantity consumed. It may diminish it so
much, that even at the increased price, there will not be required so