large, and occasions a greater loss to the restricted country, and to
the other countries with which that country would have traded, than gain
to the country in whose favour the restrictions are imposed. And lastly,
because a country never could obtain such privileges from an independent
nation, and has seldom been so undisguised an oppressor as to demand
them even from its colonies, without subjecting itself to restrictions
in some degree equivalent, for the benefit of those whom it has thus
taxed. Each country, therefore, usually pays tribute to the other; and
to produce this fruitless reciprocity of exaction, the industry and
trade of both countries are diverted from the most advantageous
channels, and the return to the labour and capital of both is
diminished, in pure loss.

9. The same principles which have led to the above conclusions, also
suggest a remark of some importance with respect to the probable effect
of a change from a restricted to a comparatively free trade.

There is no doubt that our prohibiting the importation of a particular
article, which, but for the prohibition, would have been imported,
enables us to obtain our other imports at smaller cost. The article for
which we have the greatest demand, and for which our demand is most
increased by cheapness, is that which we should naturally import
preferably to any other; now of this article we should import the
quantity necessary to pay for our exports, on terms of interchange less
advantageous to us than in the case of any other commodity. If our
legislature prohibits this commodity, the other country will be obliged
to offer any other article on easier terms, in order to force a
sufficient demand for it to be an equivalent to what she purchases from
us.