returned to the world. Not even the parole laws, which provide various
reasons and ways for shortening sentences, ever lay down the rule that
one may be released when he has reformed.

A much larger class of people offers the excuse that punishment deters
from crime. In fact, this idea is so well rooted that few think of
questioning it. The idea that punishment deters from crime does not mean
that the individual prisoner is prevented from another criminal act. A
convicted man is kept in jail for as long a time as in the judgment of
the jury, the court, or the parole board, will make him atone, or at
least suffer sufficiently for the offence. If the terms are not long
enough, they can be made longer. The idea that punishment deters, means
that unless A shall be punished for murder, then B will kill; therefore
A must be punished, not for his own sake, but to keep B from crime. This
is vicarious punishment which can hardly appeal to one who is either
just or humane. But does punishing A keep B from the commission of
crime? It certainly does not make a more social man of B. If it operates
on him in any way it is to make him afraid to commit crime; but the
direct result of scaring B is not to keep him from the commission of
crime, but to make him use precautions that will keep him safe from
discovery. How far the fear of detection and punishment prevents crime
is, of course, purely theoretical and cannot be settled either by
statistics or logic. One thing is sure, that if B is kept from crime, it
is through fear, and of all the enemies of man, fear is the one which
causes most misery and pain.

There are many facts that show that the punishment of one does not deter
others. Over and over again crimes are committed, by the young
especially, that resemble in every detail a previous crime which has
received large publicity through the newspapers, often through the