the troops were becoming more and more dispirited at the failure of
their numerous attacks and the unending toll of lives. The death of
Dragut, on June 23, had proved an incalculable loss, and the jealousy
between Mustapha and Piali prevented their co-operation. The whole
course of the siege had been marked by a feverish haste and a fear of
interruption, which showed itself in ill-drawn plans. Dragut himself,
early in the siege, had pointed out the necessity of more foresight,
but his warnings went unheeded. The Turkish commanders took few
precautions, and, though they had a huge fleet, they never used it
with any effect except on one solitary occasion. They neglected their
communications with the African coast and made no attempt to watch and
intercept Sicilian reinforcements.

On September 1 Mustapha made his last effort, but all his threats and
cajoleries had but little effect on his dispirited troops, who refused
any longer to believe in the possibility of capturing those terrible
fortresses. The feebleness of the attack was a great encouragement to
the besieged, who now began to see hopes of deliverance. Mustapha's
perplexity and indecision were cut short by the news of the arrival
of Sicilian reinforcements in Melleha Bay. Hastily evacuating his
trenches, he embarked his army; but, on learning that the new troops
numbered but some 8,000, was overcome by shame and put ashore to fight
the reinforcements. It was all in vain, however, for his troops would
not stand the fierce charge of the new-comers, and, helped by the
determination of his rearguard, safely re-embarked and sailed away on
September 3.

At the moment of departure the Order had left 600 men capable of
bearing arms, but the losses of the Ottomans had been yet more
fearful. The most reliable estimate puts the number of the Turkish