susceptibilities with regard to the safety of the Federal capital.
But Lincoln made a far greater mistake in suddenly reducing
McClellan's army by 40,000 men, and by removing Banks from his
jurisdiction, when the plan of campaign had been approved by the
Cabinet, and it was already too late to change it. It is possible,
considering the political situation, that the garrison of Washington
was too small, and it was certainly inefficient; but the best way of
protecting Washington was to give McClellan the means of advancing
rapidly upon Richmond. Such an advance would have made a Confederate
counterstroke against the Northern capital, or even a demonstration,
impossible. But to take away from McClellan 40,000 men, the very
force with which he intended to turn the Yorktown lines and drive the
enemy back on Richmond, and at the same time to isolate Banks in the
Shenandoah Valley, was simply playing into the enemy's hands. What
Lincoln did not see was that to divide the Federal army into three
portions, working on three separate lines, was to run a far greater
risk than would be incurred by leaving Washington weakly garrisoned.
I cannot bring myself to believe that he in the least realised all
that was involved in changing a plan of operations so vast as
McClellan's.

Again, look at the folly of which Mr. Benjamin, the Confederate
Secretary of War, was guilty at the same period. The reader should
carefully study the chapter in which Colonel Henderson describes
Stonewall Jackson's resignation of his command when his arrangements
in the field were altered, without his cognizance, by the Secretary
of War.

I should like to emphasise his words: "That the soldier," he says,
"is but the servant of the statesman, as war is but an instrument of