within sight of the gates of Washington. Colonel Henderson deals only
with what I think may be called the period of Southern victories, for
the tide began to ebb when Jackson fell; and those who read his
volumes will, I am convinced, look forward eagerly to his story of
the years which followed, when Grant, with the skill of a practised
strategist, threw a net round the Confederate capital, drawing it
gradually together until he imprisoned its starving garrison, and
compelled Lee, the ablest commander of his day, to surrender at
discretion.

But the application of strategical and tactical principles, and the
example of noble lives, are not the only or even the most valuable
lessons of great wars. There are lessons which concern nations rather
than individuals; and there are two to be learnt from the Secession
War which are of peculiar value to both England and the United
States, whose armies are comparatively small and raised by voluntary
enlistment. The first is the necessity of maintaining at all times
(for it is impossible to predict what tomorrow may have in store for
us) a well-organised standing army in the highest state of
efficiency, and composed of thoroughly-trained and full-grown men.
This army to be large enough for our military requirements, and
adapted to the character, the habits, and the traditions of the
people. It is not necessary that the whole force should be actually
serving during peace: one half of it, provided it is periodically
drilled and exercised, can be formed into a Reserve; the essential
thing is that it should be as perfect a weapon as can be forged.

The second lesson is that to hand over to civilians the
administration and organisation of the army, whether in peace or in
war, or to allow them to interfere in the selection of officers for