[Footnote C: Mackay's _History of Popular Delusions._]

[Footnote D: Doubleday's _Financial History of England_, p. 93.]

More recent revulsions are still more to the point. In 1825, in England,
there were enormous speculations in joint-stock enterprises and foreign
loans. Some five hundred and thirty-two new companies were formed, with
a nominal capital of about $2,200,000,000, and Greek, Austrian, and
South American loans were negotiated, to the extent of $275,000,000.
Scarcely one of these companies or of these loans ever paid a dividend;
and the consequence was a general destruction of credit and property,
and a degree of distress which was compared to the terrible sufferings
inflicted by the Mississippi and the South-Sea Bubbles. Yet there
were no bank-notes in circulation in England under five pounds, or
twenty-five dollars. Again, our readers may recall the monstrous
overtrading in railroad shares in the years 1845-6. Projects involving
the investment of £500,000,000 were set on foot in a very little while;
the contagion of purchasing spread to all the provincial towns; the
traditionally staid and sober Englishman got as mad as a March hare
about them; Mr. Murdle reigned triumphant; and, in the end, the nation
had to pay for its delirium with another season of panic, misery, and
ruin. Yet during all this excitement there were not only no small notes
in circulation, but, what is most remarkable, there was no unusual
increase in the issues of the banks, of any kind.

Let us not hope too much, therefore, from the suppression of small
notes, should that scheme be carried into effect; let us not delude
ourselves with the expectation that it will prove a satisfactory remedy,
in any sense, for the periodical disease of the currency; for its