on leaving the Transvaal for Europe had been "for the purpose of seeking
recognition and intervention," but the success of their mission at
Washington was not to be greater than it had been in European capitals.
Although Mr. Hay received them courteously their competence to treat
directly with the State Department was not recognized. When they
realized this fact they appealed directly to the people in the hope of
bringing a certain amount of pressure to bear upon the President from
that source. He fully realized, however, that under the circumstances no
interference was advisable. A departure from this policy would have
created a precedent which might later have been appealed to by any
European government in behalf of its subjects in this country. As
Presidential candidate, however, William J. Bryan, in effect, if not in
express terms, promised a mediation that would mean something should the
Democrats come into power, and it was hopes created by such utterances
which encouraged the Boers to believe that intervention on the part of
the United States was a possibility. Even the Senate passed resolutions
of sympathy which only held out a vain hope and naturally caused a
certain amount of criticism in England. In the end, however, the envoys
became convinced that nothing was to be hoped for in the way of
dictatorial interference by the United States.

[Footnote 17: Moore, Digest of Int. Law, Vol. I, p. 213]

In his message to Congress, in 1899, three months after the war began,
President McKinley had been able to declare: "This Government has
maintained an attitude of neutrality in the unfortunate contest between
Great Britain and the Boer States of Africa. We have remained faithful
to the precept of avoiding entangling alliances as to affairs not of our
direct concern. Had circumstances suggested that the parties to the
quarrel would have welcomed any kindly expression of the hope of the