needed, but it seems obvious that the motive which actuated the
purchases was rather the greater ease in evading neutral prohibitions
than the desire to secure a better market at a distance of ten thousand
miles from the seat of war. Possibly both motives actuated the
purchases, but it is nevertheless true that the United States ports were
used to a far greater extent than those of any other neutral Government.
The last statement is borne out by the Report of the Royal Commission on
the War in South Africa, which shows that from November, 1899, to June,
1902, inclusive, no fewer than 191,363 horses and mules were shipped
from the ports of the United States for the British forces in South
Africa, aggregating a total cost to Great Britain of approximately
$20,175,775. The entire cost in the United States and elsewhere for such
purchases at the end of July, 1902, amounted to $52,000,000 in round
numbers. The entire cost incurred within the United States was greater
than that incurred in any other country. In Hungary the cost to Great
Britain for horses and mules was $8,203,505; in Spain $1,667,695; in
Italy $688,690; in the Argentine Republic, the British colonies and
elsewhere, $21,284,335.[25]

[Footnote 25: Sessional Papers of the House of Commons, C. 1792 (1903),
p. 260.]

In view of this undoubted use of the ports and waters of the United
States by one of the belligerents in a war toward which a neutral
attitude had been declared, it may be inquired how far the condition of
affairs was known to the Administration and what opportunity there was
for executive action, especially with reference to the allegation made
by the Transvaal that the port of New Orleans was used as a base of
warlike supplies for the British forces.