able to continue their work of destruction only by means of the supplies
of horses and mules which were shipped from the port of New Orleans. The
application for an injunction was denied on the ground that the
enforcement of the treaty obligations of the Government is a function of
the President with which the courts have nothing to do.

The district judge in delivering the opinion declared that there was
nothing in the principles of international law or in the terms of the
Treaty of Washington, to which an appeal had been made, to prevent the
citizens of a neutral state from selling supplies of war to a
belligerent. The court went on to discuss the right of private citizens
to sell supplies to belligerents, but did not enter upon the question
whether or not the United States had permitted the British Government to
make use of its ports and waters as a base for the purpose of the
augmentation of its military supplies. The entire discussion of
questions of international law was considered by the court as beyond its
cognizance. The court said: "If the complainants could be heard to
assert here rights personal to themselves in the treaty just mentioned,
and if the mules and horses involved in the case are munitions of war,
all of which is disputed by the defendants, it would become necessary to
determine, whether the treaty is meant to prevent private citizens from
selling supplies to the belligerents." The court then proceeded: "But
the nature of this cause is such that none of the considerations
hereinbefore set out need be decided," because "the case is a political
one of which a court of equity can take no cognizance, and which in the
very nature of governmental things must belong to the executive branch
of the Government."[55]

[Footnote 55: Pearson _v_ Parson 108 Fed. Rep. 461]