the high honor of Kentucky, as I am informed, she has been the owner of
some slaves by escheat and has sold none, but liberated all. I hope the
same is true of some other States. Indeed I do not believe it would be
physically possible for the General Government to return persons so
circumstanced to actual slavery. I believe there would be physical
resistance to it which could neither be turned aside by argument nor
driven away by force. In this view I have no objection to this feature
of the bill. Another matter involved in these two sections, and running
through other parts of the act, will be noticed hereafter.

I perceive no objection to the third and fourth sections.

So far as I wish to notice the fifth and sixth sections, they may be
considered together. That the enforcement of these sections would do no
injustice to the persons embraced within them is clear. That those who
make a causeless war should be compelled to pay the cost of it is too
obviously just to be called in question. To give governmental protection
to the property of persons who have abandoned it and gone on a crusade
to overthrow that same government is absurd if considered in the mere
light of justice. The severest justice may not always be the best
policy. The principle of seizing and appropriating the property of the
persons embraced within these sections is certainly not very
objectionable, but a justly discriminating application of it would be
very difficult, and to a great extent impossible. And would it not be
wise to place a power of remission somewhere, so that these persons may
know they have something to lose by persisting and something to save by
desisting? I am not sure whether such power of remission is or is not
within section 13.

Without any special act of Congress, I think our military commanders,