established to compensate the capitalists who may engage in such
undertaking and complete the work.


No person can be more deeply sensible than myself of the danger of
entangling alliances with any foreign nation. That we should avoid such
alliances has become a maxim of our policy consecrated by the most
venerated names which adorn our history and sanctioned by the unanimous
voice of the American people. Our own experience has taught us the
wisdom of this maxim in the only instance, that of the guaranty to
France of her American possessions, in which we have ever entered into
such an alliance. If, therefore, the very peculiar circumstances of the
present case do not greatly impair, if not altogether destroy, the force
of this objection, then we ought not to enter into the stipulation,
whatever may be its advantages. The general considerations which have
induced me to transmit the treaty to the Senate for their advice may be
summed up in the following particulars:

1. The treaty does not propose to guarantee a territory to a foreign
nation in which the United States will have no common interest with that
nation. On the contrary, we are more deeply and directly interested in
the subject of this guaranty than New Granada herself or any other
country.

2. The guaranty does not extend to the territories of New Granada
generally, but is confined to the single Province of the Isthmus of
Panama, where we shall acquire by the treaty a common and coextensive
right of passage with herself.

3. It will constitute no alliance for any political object, but for a