Our Army pursued its march upon the capital, and as it approached it was
met by formidable resistance. Our forces first encountered the enemy,
and achieved signal victories in the severely contested battles of
Contreras and Churubusco. It was not until after these actions had
resulted in decisive victories and the capital of the enemy was within
our power that the Mexican Government manifested any disposition to
enter into negotiations for peace, and even then, as events have proved,
there is too much reason to believe they were insincere, and that in
agreeing to go through the forms of negotiation the object was to gain
time to strengthen the defenses of their capital and to prepare for
fresh resistance.

The general in command of the Army deemed it expedient to suspend
hostilities temporarily by entering into an armistice with a view to the
opening of negotiations. Commissioners were appointed on the part of
Mexico to meet the commissioner on the part of the United States. The
result of the conferences which took place between these functionaries
of the two Governments was a failure to conclude a treaty of peace.

The commissioner of the United States took with him the project of a
treaty already prepared, by the terms of which the indemnity required by
the United States was a cession of territory.

It is well known that the only indemnity which it is in the power of
Mexico to make in satisfaction of the just and long-deferred claims of
our citizens against her and the only means by which she can reimburse
the United States for the expenses of the war is a cession to the United
States of a portion of her territory. Mexico has no money to pay, and no
other means of making the required indemnity. If we refuse this, we can