stationed at any one post may be too small to pursue him. If the enemy
be repulsed in one attack, he would have nothing to do but to retreat to
his own side of the line, and, being in no fear of a pursuing army, may
reenforce himself at leisure for another attack on the same or some
other post. He may, too, cross the line between our posts, make rapid
incursions into the country which we hold, murder the inhabitants,
commit depredations on them, and then retreat to the interior before a
sufficient force can be concentrated to pursue him. Such would probably
be the harassing character of a mere defensive war on our part. If our
forces when attacked, or threatened with attack, be permitted to cross
the line, drive back the enemy, and conquer him, this would be again to
invade the enemy's country after having lost all the advantages of the
conquests we have already made by having voluntarily abandoned them.

To hold such a line successfully and in security it is far from being
certain that it would not require as large an army as would be necessary
to hold all the conquests we have already made and to continue the
prosecution of the war in the heart of the enemy's country. It is also
far from being certain that the expenses of the war would be diminished
by such a policy.

I am persuaded that the best means of vindicating the national honor and
interest and of bringing the war to an honorable close will be to
prosecute it with increased energy and power in the vital parts of the
enemy's country.

In my annual message to Congress of December last I declared that--

The war has not been waged with a view to conquest, but, having been
commenced by Mexico, it has been carried into the enemy's country and