be conceived as mere 'appearance.'

In reply, it is suggested:

(1) That it is impossible to reconcile the conception of eternal Good
with the obvious fact of temporal Evil.

(2) That such a view reduces to an absurdity all action directed to
ends in Time. And yet it seems that such action not only is but ought
to be pursued, as appears to be admitted even by those who hold that
Good exists eternally, since they make it an end of action that they
should come to see that everything is good.

(3) That this latter conception of the end of action--namely, that we
should bring ourselves to see that what appears to be Evil is really
Good--is too flagrantly opposed to common sense to be seriously
accepted.

To sum up:

In this Book the following positions have been discussed and rejected:

(1) That our ideas about Good have no relation to any real fact.

(2) That we have easy and simple criteria of Good--such as (a)
an infallible instinct, (b) the course of Nature, (c) current
conventions, (d) pleasure.

(3) That all Reality is good, and all Evil is mere 'appearance.'