(1) Can any Good be an end for us unless it is conceived to be an
object of consciousness? The negative answer is suggested.

(2) In pursuing Good, for whom do we pursue it? It is suggested that
the Good we pursue is

(a) That of future generations. Some difficulties in this view are
brought out; and it is hinted that what we really pursue is the Good
of 'the Whole,' though it is not easy to see what we mean by that.

(b) That of 'the species.' But this view too is seen to be involved
in difficulty.

II. The difficulty is left unsolved, and the conversation passes on
to an examination of some of our activities from the point of view
of Good. In this examination a double object is kept in view: (1) to
bring out the characteristics and defects of each kind of Good; (2) to
suggest a Good which might be conceived to be free from defects, such
a Good being referred to as '_The_ Good.'

(1) It is first suggested that _all_ activities are good, if pursued
in the proper order and proportion; and that what seems bad in each,
viewed in isolation, is seen to be good in a general survey of them
all. This view, it is argued, is too extravagant to be tenable.

(2) It is suggested that Good consists in ethical activity. To this it
is objected that ethical actions are always means to an end, and that
it is this end that must be conceived to be really good.

(3) The activity of the senses in their direct contact with physical