ruler of Spain and Flanders, against its traditional enemy, France, was
for the latter country to keep a tight hold of its alliance with
Scotland, by means of which English force might be diverted at any time.
The existence of the Scottish "back door" to England, with the ever
probable enemy behind it, had long been a check upon English power, and
a humiliation to English kings in their efforts to hold the balance
between the Continental rivals. But with the spread of Lutheranism in
Germany and Henry VIII.'s defiance of the Papacy, the Catholic powers,
drawn together in the face of common danger, found a fresh bond of union
in their orthodoxy which partially superseded old rivalries.

In these circumstances the English policy, which had aimed at the
control of Scottish foreign relations to the exclusion of French
influence, became not only desirable as it always had been, but vitally
necessary to preserve England's independence.

Henry VIII.'s policy towards Scotland had been that of _divide et
impera_, and a series of royal minorities and the greed and poverty of
the semi-independent Scottish nobles had aided him. The rout of the
Scots at Solway Moss, and the pathetic passing of the gallant James V.,
leaving his new-born daughter, Mary, as queen (December 1542), seemed at
length to place Scotland in England's power. The murder of Cardinal
Beaton, the bribery of the Douglases, and the marriage of Lennox with
Henry's sister were all subsequent moves in the same game. Mary was
betrothed in her cradle to the heir of England, and France, whose sheet
anchor for centuries had been the "auld alliance" with the Scots,
appeared to be helpless against a coalition of England and the emperor.

Thenceforward, England's main object was to keep a tight grip upon
Scotland by religion or otherwise, while at first France, and